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The Chicken or the Egg Dilemma:
Introducing Alternative Fuels into the
California Marketplace
I. INTRODUCTION
During the first Arab oil embargo in 1974, concern arose over
the future availability of oil to supply the United States' energy re-
quirements.' Recently, public concern over environmental deteriora-
tion has focused on the impact of burning various fuels.2 In response
to these concerns, foreign and domestic legislatures currently regulate
the composition of existing fuels and are considering additional meth-
ods to introduce alternative fuels. 3 Two such regulatory responses are
the California Air Resources Board ("ARB") proposal4 and the Bra-
zilian National Alcohol Plan ("Proalcool"). 5
This Comment focuses on the legality of the ARB's proposed
requirements for gasoline suppliers and automakers. The ARB pro-
posal requires that suppliers produce and distribute clean alternative
fuels, and that automakers produce low-emission vehicles that use
these fuels beginning with the 1994 model year. 6 In addition, this
Comment addresses Brazil's experience over the last ten years with
Proalcool, a plan introducing hydrated ethanol as an alternative fuel.
7
Finally, this Comment discusses how the Brazilian experience can
provide guidance to California as it embarks on a program mandating
the use of alternative fuels.
For purposes of this Comment, an alternative fuel is a fuel, other
than gasoline, that cannot be used in an existing automobile without
1. ENERGY TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK at xxvi (Douglas M. Considine ed., 1977) ("It is
now universally conceded that fossil fuels are finite.").
2. See generally Richard A. Corbett, Tough Air-Quality Goals Spur Quest for Transpor-
tation Fuel Changes, OIL & GAS J., June 18, 1990, at 33-42. "The resurgence of environmen-
tal awareness in the U.S. could present a refining challenge during the 1990s .... " Id. at 33.
3. For two examples of such regulations, see infra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. At
the federal level, the recently passed Clean Air Act contains many fuel quality provisions.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 7407(d) (West Supp. 1991)).
4. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1189-97 (1990).
5. Proalcool was established by presidential decree. F. JOSEPH DEMETRIUS, BRAZIL'S
NATIONAL ALCOHOL PROGRAM: TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT 10 (1990).
6. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1189-97.
7. See DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 11.
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major changes to the vehicle's fuel system.8 Alternative fuels include
methanol, ethanol, liquid petroleum gas ("LPG"), compressed natu-
ral gas ("CNG"), and electricity. 9 Thus, either automakers must pro-
duce specifically designed vehicles that use these alternative fuels, or
auto repair facilities must undertake massive efforts to retrofit existing
vehicles.
Unfortunately, during the initial stages of market development
for an alternative fuel, insufficient demand for the alternative fuel will
not justify investment in production or marketing facilities by free en-
terprise businesses.10 Further, if the alternative fuel is unavailable,
consumers will not purchase or retrofit a vehicle demanding its use.1"
Auto manufacturers, in turn, will not produce alternative fuel vehicles
if no consumer demand exists for such vehicles. This is the "chicken
or the egg" dilemma.12 Which comes first, vehicle production or al-
ternative fuel production and dispensing facilities?
In the ARB proposal, regulatory authorities purport to address
this "chicken or egg" dilemma of alternative fuels and vehicles, by
mandating their use without subsidies.' 3 By contrast, the Brazilian
government has forced "neat"'14 ethanol use over the past ten years as
an alternate fuel by giving credit to nearly all proposed ethanol pro-
duction projects, 15 heavily taxing gasoline at the point of sale,16 and
subsidizing consumer credit on the purchase of alcohol-fueled
vehicles. 17
8. Changes may include modifying fuel tank and line construction materials because
of the corrosive nature of the alternative fuel; changing the catalytic converter catalyst because
of different reactive characteristics of alternative fuel exhaust; and modifying computer control
of fuel injection because of varied alternative fuel energy content. DAN KNOWLES, ALTERNA-
TIVE AUTOMOTIVE FUELS (1984).
9. CALIFORNIA ARB, INITIAL STATEMENT OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR LOW-
EMISSION VEHICLES AND CLEAN FUELS 41 (1990) [hereinafter ARB INITIAL STATEMENT].
10. Elizabeth Corcoran, One for the Road: Will Alcohol-Fueled Cars Take Off or Back-
fire?, Sci. AM., Dec. 1988, at 110.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1193-97.
14. A "neat fuel" is one that is not mixed with other fuels. Methanol and ethanol may be
burned in a vehicle designed for its use in either a pure, neat form such as MI00, which is
100% methanol, or mixed with gasoline in small quantities and burned in conventional gaso-
line-powered vehicles. Corcoran, supra note 10, at 110.
15. MICHAEL BARZELAY, THE POLITICIZED MARKET ECONOMY: ALCOHOL IN BRA-
ZIL'S ENERGY STRATEGY 203 (1986).
16. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 99.
17. BARZELAY, supra note 15, at 75.
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II. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD PROPOSED MANDATE
FOR SUPPLY AND SALE OF CLEAN FUEL
The ARB is a state-wide regulatory agency charged by the Cali-
fornia Legislature with the duty to "systematically attack the serious
problem caused by motor vehicles, which is the major source of air
pollution in many areas of the state."' 8 In 1990, the ARB proposed
new gasoline composition and vehicle emission specifications to ad-
dress California's air quality problems. 19 The first part of this pro-
gram calls for increasingly stringent gasoline specifications. 20 The
second part of this program mandates market-forcing techniques. 21
At issue is whether the market-forcing techniques called for to intro-
duce clean alternative fuels and low-emission vehicles ("Clean Fuel/
Low-Emission Vehicle regulations") are constitutional under the
United States and California constitutions.
The second part of the proposed program calls for completely
new vehicle designs and clean alternative fuels to power the new vehi-
cles.22 In addition, this phase establishes exhaust emission standards
for vehicles in four progressively demanding vehicle emission catego-
ries: (1) Transitional Low-Emission Vehicles ("TLEVs"); (2) Low-
Emission Vehicles ("LEVs"); (3) Ultra-Low Emission Vehicles
("ULEVs"); and (4) Zero-Emission Vehicles ("ZEVs"). 23 To reduce
air pollution levels, vehicle manufacturers must produce and market
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39003 (Deering 1986). Following this mandate,
the ARB sets "emission standards" for vehicles, defined by the California Legislature as "spec-
ified limitations on the discharge of air contaminants into the atmosphere." Id. § 39027 (Deer-
ing 1986).
"[L]ocal and regional [regulatory] authorities [not the ARB] have the primary responsi-
bility for control of air pollutions from all sources, other than emissions from motor vehicles."
Id. § 40000 (Deering 1986) (emphasis added).
19. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1189-97.
20. Id. at 1189-93. The first part of the ARB's proposed program sets more stringent
controls on gasoline volatility ("Reid Vapor Pressure"), mandates the addition of deposit con-
trol additives, and orders the removal of all lead from gasoline. Id.
21. Id. at 1193-97. A market-forcing technique is a method whereby the regulatory com-
munity mandates changes in the way business is conducted in the marketplace that would not
occur naturally, given the incrementally higher costs associated with the mandated changes.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1193-94. The 50,000 mile standard for passenger cars, expressed in grams per
mile, is as follows:
1992]
408 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. LJ. [Vol. 14:405
vehicles from one of the above emission category descriptions. 24 The
average level of the emissions from all vehicles sold must meet pro-
gressively stringent standards, beginning with the 1994 model year
and extending through 2003.25 The pollution standards measure non-
methane organic gases ("NMOG"), which are undesirable polluting
hydrocarbons.26 Manufacturers may sell any combination of TLEVs,
LEVs, ULEVs, ZEVs, and conventional vehicles to meet the stan-
dards, as long as the average NMOG emissions from all vehicles sold
does not exceed the mandated average. 27
To meet the proposed stringent low-emission vehicle standards,
Pollutant: NMOG CO NOX HCHO
(Non-methane (Carbon (Nitrogen (Formaldehyde)
organic gases) monoxide) oxides)
1993 Conventional
Vehicles 0.25 3.4 0.4 0.15
TLEV 0.125 3.4 0.4 0.15
LEV 0,075 3.4 0.2 0.15
ULEV 0.040 1.7 0.2 0.08
ZEV 0 0 0 0
If a vehicle can operate on either conventional gasoline or an alternative fuel, the non-methane



















By requiring progressively lower levels of non-methane organic gases, fewer hydrocarbons will
be emitted to react in the atmosphere and deplete the ozone. In addition, since some of these





vehicle manufacturers could require the design and production of ve-
hicles using clean alternative fuel. 28 The clean fuel requirements of
the ARB proposal ensure that low-emission fuels are available for
consumers after they purchase such vehicles. 29 The proposed clean
fuel supply regulations affect three levels of distribution. First, gaso-
line suppliers must distribute appropriate quantities of clean fuels to
the wholesale market. Second, owners or lessors of retail gasoline
outlets must equip an appropriate number of service stations to dis-
pense each clean fuel. Third, station operators must distribute the
clean fuels to the public. 30
A discussion of the second part of the Clean Fuel/Low-Emission
Vehicle regulations of the ARB proposal raises four constitutional is-
sues: (1) whether the ARB has the authority to promulgate such a
regulation; (2) whether requiring the supply and sale of alternative
fuels constitutes a "taking" of the gasoline marketer's business;3 (3)
whether requiring a marketer to enter into a new business violates the
due process clauses of the United States and California constitu-
tions; 32 and (4) the constitutional implications of requirements that
may, in fact, be impossible, such as the forced sale of particular
volumes of clean fuel when consumer demand may not support those
mandated volumes.
A. Regulatory Authority
Section 39000 of the California Health and Safety Code ("Health
and Safety Code") states that, in the opinion of the California Legisla-
ture, "the people of the State... have a primary interest in the quality
of the physical environment in which they live."33 The Legislature
took two steps to coordinate state, regional, and local efforts to pro-
tect and enhance the air quality of the environment. First, it divided
28. A "clean alternative fuel" is a non-gasoline fuel that can be used in vehicles giving off
lower emissions, such as TLEVs, LEVs, ULEVs, and ZEVs. ARB INmAL STATEMENT,
supra note 9, at 41.
29. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1194.
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. See infra note 53 for the text
and a discussion of the "taking" provisions of the United States and California constitutions.
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a). The Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides, "No State shall make or enforce any law... [that
will] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. Similarly, the California Constitution states, "A person may not be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
33. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39000 (Deering 1986).
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California into air districts, or basins, 34 to develop regional strategies
to control air pollution from all vehicular sources. Second, it man-
dated the formation of the ARB to control vehicular pollution
sources.
35
The California Supreme Court held, in Western Oil and Gas
Ass'n v. Orange County Air Pollution District,36 that the Orange
County Air Pollution Control District, as a local district, had no au-
thority to regulate the lead content of gasoline used in automobiles.
37
The court found that the ARB, rather than the local district, pos-
sessed the authority to regulate gasoline ingredients.38 Arguably then,
the ARB has authority to regulate clean fuels.
Under section 43013 of the Health and Safety Code, the ARB
"may adopt and implement motor vehicle emission standards, in-use
performance standards, and motor vehicle fuel specifications for the
control of air contaminants and sources of air pollution which the
state board has found to be necessary, cost-effective, and technologi-
cally feasible."' 39 This language, combined with the reasoning in
Western Oil and Gas Ass'n, suggests that the ARB has the authority
to regulate both vehicle emissions and fuel content by way of fuel
specifications. 4° As the court stated in Western Oil and Gas Ass'n,
"The regulation of an emission may be accomplished either by
mechanical means. . . or by specifying the ingredients of the gasoline
used in the engine."'4 ' The proposed ARB Clean Fuel/Low-Emission
Vehicle regulations discussed in this Comment mandate both
"mechanical" and "ingredient" solutions to the current air quality
problem.42 Therefore, the Health and Safety Code gives the ARB the
authority to set fuel specifications.
34. Id. § 39001 (Deering 1986).
35. Id. § 39002 (Deering 1986).
36. 534 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1975).
37. Id. at 1334.
38. Id. The court stated, "If we were to hold that the ARB has no power to regulate fuel
content, we would be attributing to the Legislature an intention to deprive the agency of the
only realistic means at its disposal to achieve the purposes of the act [i.e., vehicular emission
control]." Id.
39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43013 (Deering Supp. 1991).
40. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n, 534 P.2d at 1333-34.
41. Id. at 1333.
42. The proposed regulations require a "mechanical" solution to the air quality problem
by mandating the production and sale of a mix of TLEVs, LEVs, ULEVs, and ZEVs in order
to meet fleet average exhaust standards. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1193.
The proposed regulations mandate an "ingredient" solution by requiring the sale of clean alter-
native fuels. Id. at 1194.
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The question remains, however, whether fuel specifications en-
compass entirely different fuels. Does the ARB have the authority to
dictate what fuels marketers must supply? It is a well-settled legal
principle in California that a regulatory agency's power derives only
from its specific statutory mandate. 43 However, it is unclear whether
the proposed Clean Fuel/Low-Emission Vehicle regulations fall
within the scope of the ARB's statutory mandate.
In 1988, the California Legislature recognized the magnitude of
the state's air quality problem by adding section 43018 to the Health
and Safety Code. Section 43018(a) requires that the ARB "shall en-
deavor to achieve the maximum degree of emission reduction possible
from vehicular and other mobile sources in order to accomplish the
attainment of the state standards at the earliest practicable date.""
Section 43018(b) sets January 1, 1992, as the deadline for establishing
these standards, and requires that the ARB "take whatever actions are
necessary, cost-effective, and technologically feasible in order to
achieve, not later than December 31, 2000, a reduction in the actual
emissions of reactive organic gases of at least 55 percent, [and] a re-
duction in emissions of oxides of nitrogen of at least 15 percent. '45
The present conventional vehicle NMOG standard is 0.25 grams
per mile traveled by the vehicle. 46 The proposed standard calls for a
steady reduction in NMOG emissions from 0.25 grams per mile in
1994 to 0.062 grams per mile in 2003 and beyond. 47 This drastic re-
duction will require significant modifications to conventional vehicles,
as well as the use of fuels other than conventional gasoline.
48
43. In People v. Firstenberg, 155 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1979), the Second District California
Court of Appeal noted that the power of the regulatory authority (in this case, the Department
of Health) must come from the Legislature. Id. at 87-88. However, in First Industrial Loan
Co. v. Daugherty, 159 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1945), the California Supreme Court stated that "the
power... 'to establish such rules and regulations as may be reasonable or necessary to carry
out the purpose and provisions of the act does not include power to alter the statute or enlarge
or impair its scope.'" Id. at 926 (citations omitted). In Salmon Trollers Marketing Ass'n v.
Fullerton, 177 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1981), the First District California Court of Appeal stated that
"delegation by the Legislature [to regulatory authorities] is viewed as a positive and beneficial
way to implement legislation." Id. at 366.
44. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018(a) (Deering Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
45. Id. § 43018(b) (emphasis added).
46. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1194.
47. Id. at 1193. See supra note 25 for the specific standards required by each year.
48. ARB INITIAL bTATEMENT, supra note 9, at 28-32. In 1987, the California Legisla-
ture adopted AB 234, which created the California Advisory Board on Air Quality and Fuels.
The Advisory Board included representatives of fuel and energy producers, automobile manu-
facturers, state and local governmental agencies, and the general public. The Advisory Board
concluded that the use of cleaner-burning fuels would improve air quality beyond what is
1992]
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Section 43018(c) of the Health and Safety code specifically man-
dates that the ARB adopt
the most cost-effective combination of control measures... includ-
ing, but not limited to, all of the following:
(1) Reductions in motor vehicle exhaust and evaporative emissions.
(2) Reductions in emissions from in-use emissions from motor ve-
hicles through improvements in emission system durability and
performance.
(3) Requiring the purchase of low-emission vehicles by state fleet
operators.
(4) Specification of vehicular fuel composition.
49
Clearly, the California Legislature recognizes that air quality re-
mains a significant problem. Although the Legislature did not list the
introduction of alternative fuels as a mandated alternative in section
43018(c), it stated explicitly that the options listed were not exhaus-
tive. Thus, ARB regulations requiring the introduction of alternative
fuels are within the statutory mandate.
However, for a quasi-legislative administrative action to be valid,
it must fall within the scope of authority conferred by the enabling
statute.50 California courts consistently recognize that "the construc-
tion of a statute by officials charged with its administration, including
their interpretation of the authority invested in them to implement
and carry out its provisions, is entitled to great weight." 5' Therefore,
even though section 43018(c) of the Health and Safety Code does not
call specifically for the introduction of alternative fuels, the ARB is
not precluded from providing for their sale. Alternative fuel use will
occur if the ARB determines that the fuels are cost-effective and nec-
essary to meet the mandated fifty-five percent reactive organic and
fifteen percent nitrogen oxide emission reductions. 52
B. "Taking" Analysis-Required Alternative Fuel Sales
The United States and California constitutions prohibit the tak-
ing of private property for public use without the payment of just
compensation. 5a The proposed ARB regulation requires "that gaso-
achievable by conventionally fueled vehicles equipped with the most advanced emission con-
trols. Id. at 15.
49. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018(c).
50. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11342.1, 11342.2 (Deering 1982).
51. Morris v. Williams, 433 P.2d 697, 707 (Cal. 1967).
52. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018(b).
53. See U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19. The Fifth Amendment,
which was originally intended to apply solely to the federal government, provides in part that
[Vol. 14:405
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line suppliers distribute appropriate quantities of clean fuels; ... that
owners or lessors of retail gasoline outlets equip an appropriate
number of [gasoline] stations to dispense each clean fuel; and ... that
the operators of these stations make clean fuels available to the pub-
lic."'3 4 Thus, service station owners must allocate a portion of their
property to dispensing clean alternative fuels. In addition, owners
must invest capital for storage and dispensing equipment.55 Argua-
bly, these requirements effectively "take" suppliers' and owners' pri-
vate properties for a public use, thereby entitling suppliers and owners
to just compensation. However, before these individuals are entitled
to just compensation, a court must find that the government's action
constitutes a taking, rather than a mere regulation. 56 If the court
finds the action is a mere regulation, the government need not provide
just compensation.
5 7
1. Permanent Physical Occupation
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. 58 the United
States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a statute re-
quiring landlords to permit cable companies to install transmission
equipment on their property. The Court found that a taking occurred
"private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V. This concept now applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chi-
cago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Thus, the United States Constitution indirectly recognizes the
federal power of eminent domain, which supplements any of the other powers granted to the
federal government, as an essential power of sovereignty. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367
(1876).
Similarly, the California Constitution states, "Private property may be taken or damaged
for public use only when just compensation... has first been paid to... the owner." CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 19.
While the proposed clean fuels mandate does not result in an outright taking of a service
station owner's land, it does require him to go into a business he might not otherwise choose.
A basic principle for determining the amount due an individual whose property has been taken
was stated by Justice Holmes, who noted that the test is "what has the owner lost, not what
has the taker gained." Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
54. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1194.
55. The ARB estimates the required investment for CNG to be approximately $250,000
per station. It estimates required investments for other fuels at $40,000 to $75,000 per station.
Id. at 1196.
56. Radioptics, Inc. v. United States, 621 F.2d 1113, 1127 (Ct. Cl. 1980). "[W]here the
purpose of a regulation which causes interference with property rights is to prevent injury to
the public welfare as opposed to merely bestowing upon the public a nonessential benefit, com-
pensation under the fifth amendment is not required." Id.
57. Id.
58. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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and that the landlord was due compensation, in an amount to be de-
termined by the state courts on remand.5 9 Furthermore, the Court
stated that "when the character of the government action is a perma-
nent physical occupation of property, our cases have uniformly found
a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether
the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal
economic impact on the owner." 6
However, the United States Supreme Court has never considered
whether mandating installation of equipment for sale of clean fuels
constitutes a "permanent physical occupation" of the service station
owner's property. Certainly, such equipment would take up space
and the owner would have to dedicate some portion of his or her
property to housing this equipment. The owner would incur this ex-
pense regardless of whether the owner has an interest in entering this
market. Furthermore, the owner may not receive an adequate return
on his or her investment once the owner has done so. Nonetheless,
the owner would retain control of the business, as well as any benefit
from its operation. Thus, no taking would occur because there would
be no "permanent physical occupation." However, while there may
be no physical occupation, a significant impact on the service station
owner may occur if he or she receives an inadequate return on this
mandated investment and an alternative use had been designated for
the space and capital. Moving the facility to a state where no regula-
tions mandate such an investment is not a reasonable alternative given
the fixed costs, such as land and building costs, necessary to start a
new business in another location.
2. Adequate Return on Investment
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis6l ("Key-
stone") the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of
59. Id. at 441. The Court stated, "The issue of the amount of compensation that is due,
on which we express no opinion, is a matter for the state courts to consider on remand." Id.
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals declared that the Commission on Cable
Television should determine reasonable compensation for the "taking." The court of appeals
retained jurisdiction for purposes of reviewing whether the compensation fixed by the Commis-
sion on Cable Television was just. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 446
N.E.2d 428 (N.Y. 1983). If the case ultimately went to trial, the adequacy of the compensa-
tion would be determined by (1) assessing the permanent damages, and (2) measuring the
damages as the difference, if any, between the fair market value of the landlord's property
before the taking and the fair market value of the remainder after the taking. Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1969).
60. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35 (emphasis added).
61. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
414 [Vol. 14:405
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what constitutes an adequate return on a mandated investment. The
Court, quoting Agins v. Tiburon,62 noted that "land use regulation can
effect a taking if it 'does not substantially advance legitimate state in-
terests .... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.' "63
In Keystone, the Supreme Court evaluated the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania Subsidence Act,64 which required the Pennsylvania De-
partment of Environmental Resources to implement and enforce a
comprehensive program to prevent or minimize land subsidence
caused by sub-surface mining.65 The Court held that the Penn-
sylvania Subsidence Act was not a taking, noting that the land subsi-
dence was "a significant threat to the common welfare," 66 and that no
"undue interference with [the owner's] investment-backed expecta-
tions" occurred. 67
The proposed California clean alternative fuels regulation meets
the first prong of the Keystone test by advancing the legitimate state
interest of attaining clean air.68 However, the second prong of the
Keystone test, economic viability, is more difficult to quantify. The
ARB estimates that the service station installation investment for
fuels other than CNG will cost $40,000 to $70,000 per station.69 It is
difficult to predict whether fuel demand and market price will provide
62. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). This case considered a zoning ordinance that required the own-
ers of a five-acre tract of land to build no more than five single-family residences on their
property. Without the ordinance, the owners could have subdivided the land into smaller
parcels. The Supreme Court balanced the government's interest in "assuring the careful and
orderly development of residential property with provision for open space areas" against the
owners' interest in maximizing the value of their property. In finding the ordinance constitu-
tional, and thereby requiring no payment of compensation to the landowners, the Court con-
cluded that "i]t cannot be said that the impact of general land use regulations has denied
appellants the 'justice and fairness' guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments." Id.
at 262.
63. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 485 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
64. Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52,
§§ 1406.1-.21 (1966 & Supp. 1991).
65. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 476.
66. Id. at 485.
67. Id.
68. In International Paper, Inc. v. Town of Jay, 928 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1991), the First
Circuit held that legislation which "protects the health and safety of... citizens," such as
clean air and water laws, is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 485. In
Union Oil of California v. EPA, 821 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court found that a state
limitation on lead levels in gasoline is "clearly designed to promote the public health," and
that the limitation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 685.
69. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1196. The ARB did not mandate in
this proposal the installation of CNG facilities, which are estimated to cost $250,000 per sta-
tion. The capital cost required to equip a station for clean fuels other than CNG is estimated
to be $40,000 to $70,000 per station. See also supra note 55.
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an adequate investment return. The United States Constitution, how-
ever, has "never been read to require the . ..courts to calculate
whether a specific individual has suffered burdens ... in excess of the
benefits received" 70 in determining whether a "taking" occurred. The
ARB projected retail prices in the year 2000 on an energy equivalent
basis of electricity at $0.59, CNG at $0.84, LPG at $0.98, methanol at
$1.44 to $1.49, and ethanol at $2.33, versus gasoline at $1.35 to $1.45
per gallon.71 At least in the case of LPG, the price differential be-
tween it and gasoline may make it possible for a service station owner
to recoup the capital equipment costs by charging the consumer
slightly higher prices. 72 For methanol and ethanol, whose costs are
higher than gasoline,73 this method of recovery may not be feasible.
However, as described in Keystone, the United States Supreme
Court considers the entire operation of the business unit when deter-
mining economic viability.7 4 In the beginning stages of the ARB-
mandated alternative fuels program, it is likely that alternative fuels
will constitute only a small portion of the service station business.
The ARB, acknowledging this impact, concluded that "major oil
companies and large independent stations should be able to finance
this new equipment without experiencing a significant economic
impact." 7
5
The clean fuel distribution requirements of the proposed regula-
tions assume the availability of clean fuels.76 Although the proposed
regulations do not address the economic aspect of new fuel produc-
tion, they do estimate potential clean fuel prices for a gasoline-
equivalent gallon in the year 2000.77 These prices, as stated above,
range from $0.59 for electricity, $0.84 for CNG, $0.98 for LPG, $1.44
70. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 491.
71. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1196.
72. If the two fuels were priced at the same level (i.e., LPG price set at $1.40 per
equivalent gallon, rather than $0.98 estimated cost), the service station owner would have to
sell only 100,000 gallons of LPG to recover the original investment. Putting this into perspec-
tive, the average western United States service station in 1989 sold 976,000 gallons of fuel.
Gasoline Shares by Key Categories-i 989, 82 NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS, July 1990, at 130.
73. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1196. The retail price for conventional
gasoline in the year 2000 is estimated to be $1.35 to $1.45 per gallon. Methanol is estimated to
cost $1.44 to $1.49 per gallon. Ethanol is estimated to cost $2.33 per gallon. Id.
74. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 470. In Keystone, the Court stated that
there was no showing that a mine owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations on the
whole mine were materially affected by the duty to protect against subsidence. Id. at 499.
75. ARB INITIAL STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 66.
76. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1194-95.
77. See id. at 1196.
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to $1.49 for methanol, and $2.33 for ethanol, versus an estimated
$1.35 to $1.45 per gallon for conventional gasoline.78 Assuming that
these estimates are accurate, that a fair return on investment at the
required levels of production can be obtained, and that the fuel can be
sold at these prices, there will be no "taking" requiring just
compensation.
79
3. "Taking" Analysis of Regulatory Actions
In 1990, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals heard Atlas Corp.
v. United States,80 a case considering a regulatory "taking." In Atlas
Corp., uranium and thorium producers sued the United States to re-
cover the cost of stabilizing a sand-like residue known as "tailings," a
byproduct of uranium ore processing.8' One of the plaintiff producers
in Atlas Corp. claimed that an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution resulted when the Ura-
nium Mill Tailings Reduction Control Act required it to spend large
sums of money for the reclamation of tailings.8 2 The court held that
no taking occurred because "[r]equiring money to be spent is not a
taking of property. '8 3
Similarly, the distribution of clean fuels called for by the ARB
regulations will require money to be spent on the installation and
modifications of equipment.84 This expenditure alone, however, does
not constitute a "taking" of property. In fact, the Atlas Corp. court
cited Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,85 in which the
United States Supreme Court "eschewed the development of any set
formula for identifying a 'taking'... and... relied instead on ad hoc,
78. Id.
79. See infra part II.D for a discussion of the impact when the fuels cannot be sold at
these prices.
80. 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 46 (1990).
81. Id. at 748. Tailings continue to emit low-level radiation even after the extraction of
nearly all the uranium from the ore. Id. Recognizing the potential health hazard associated
with these tailings, in 1978 Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Reduction Control
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2202, 2113, 2114, 7901-
7942 (1982)). This Act authorized the Environmental Protection Agency to develop regula-
tions for the stabilization of tailings. Similarly, in the case of the proposed clean alternative
fuel regulations, the California Legislature required the reduction in vehicle emissions and
authorized the ARB to regulate in this area.
82. Atlas Corp., 895 F.2d at 756. The Uranium Mill Tailings Reduction Control Act
required the owners and operators of uranium mills to stabilize tailings and mill sites to mini-
mize the health hazards resulting from tailings radiation and radon gas emissions. Id. at 757.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
85. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
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factual inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case."'86
Connolly identified three factors of "particular significance" to deter-
mine whether a taking has occurred: (1) the character of the govern-
ment action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation on the
plaintiff; and (3) the extent to which the regulation interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations.
8 7
The Atlas Corp. court, applying the three Connolly factors, held
that a taking did not occur when the government required the clean-
up of tailings because (1) the cleanup was done "[p]ursuant to Con-
gress' power to protect the general health, safety, and welfare;" 8 (2)
the plaintiff did not present enough evidence to show a prohibitively
large impact on its operations;8 9 and (3) the uranium industry should
have reasonably expected further regulation that would cost addi-
tional sums given its highly regulated nature.90
In a similar manner, (1) the California Legislature empowered
the ARB to clean up the air via the regulation of automobiles and
auto fuels;91 (2) the economic impact of spending capital for dispens-
ing alternative fuels is probably not prohibitive for gasoline market-
ers;92 and (3) gasoline marketers can reasonably expect further
regulation, given past regulation of fuel quality.93 As the Connolly
factors are satisfied, the ARB's proposed regulations do not constitute
a "taking" of the gasoline marketers' properties.
C. Due Process Analysis-Clean Fuel Marketing Facility
Courts use the concept of substantive due process to review the
legality of government regulation in various noneconomic 94 and eco-
nomic areas.95 The Supreme Court applies different standards of re-
86. Atlas Corp., 895 F.2d at 756-57 (citing Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224).
87. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
88. Atlas Corp., 895 F.2d at 757.
89. Id. at 758.
90. Id.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 33-52.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
93. As early as 1974, the federal government required service stations to sell unleaded
gasoline. Controls Applicable to Gasoline Retailers and Wholesale Purchaser-Consumers, 40
C.F.R. § 80.22 (1990). This regulation was withdrawn, effective June 3, 1991, because of the
widespread use of unleaded gasoline. 56 Fed. Reg. 13,767-68 (1991).
94. For example, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a
woman's interest in deciding to carry a baby was a "fundamental" one that could only be
outweighed by a "compelling state interest" in restricting abortion, through a "narrowly
drawn" statute that would fulfill only the legitimate state interest. Id. at 155.
95. For example, in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the
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view for these two situations. In the economic area, the Court
requires merely a rational relationship between the regulations and a
legitimate state objective. 96 If legislation impairs a "fundamental"
noneconomic right, the Court requires that the state's objective be
compelling, not merely legitimate, and that there be a very close rela-
tion between the objective and the means, such that the means are
necessary to achieve the ends.97
1. Reasonableness of Economic Regulatory Action
In reviewing economic regulatory actions, courts evaluate the
reasonableness of the regulations. For example, in 1934 the United
States Supreme Court, in Nebbia v. New York, 98 sustained a state reg-
ulatory scheme for milk because the regulations were reasonable in
light of the desired end. In so holding, the Court stated, "[A] state is
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to
promote public welfare . . . . 99 Additionally, in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 100 the Court made it clear that "[t]he existence
of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for reg-
ulating legislation ... unless ... it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators."101
Regulations affecting economic interests generally satisfy the
constitutional requirements of substantive due process if they are ra-
tionally related to a legitimate government interest. 0 2 If such a regu-
Supreme Court held that a federal prohibition on the interstate shipment of "filled" milk,
which is skimmed milk mixed with non-milk fats, was constitutional. It stated that "It]he
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legisla-
tion affecting ordinary commercial transactions... unless ... it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and expe-
rience of the legislators." Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
In Duke Powers Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978),
the Court upheld a $560,000,000 limit on the aggregate liability from a single nuclear accident
since Congress did not act in an arbitrary and irrational manner. Id. at 83.
96. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152.
97. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
98. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
99. Id. at 537.
100. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Court sustained a federal prohibition on the interstate ship-
ment of "filled" milk against a due process attack. See id.; see also supra note 95.
101. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
102. See American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, Inc.,
683 P.2d 670 (Cal. 1984). In this case, a woman was burned in an accident that occurred in a
hospital. The California Supreme Court held that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act, which provided for periodic damage payments in excess of $50,000 by a health care pro-
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lation infringes upon a constitutionally protected personal liberty or
fundamental right, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a suf-
ficiently substantial government interest.1°
3
The proposed clean fuel program furthers the public interest by
reducing emissions of air pollutants from motor vehicles. California
faces a serious air pollution problem. As noted by Charles Imbrecht,
Chairman of the California Energy Commission, in a statement on
alternative fuels before the United States Senate Subcommittee on En-
ergy Research and Development,
[e]ven with the nation's most aggressive program to combat air
pollution, California's major urban areas still do not meet federal
air quality standards. In the Los Angeles area, the nation's highest
unhealthful levels of ozone persist for most of each summer. In
1988 in this area, the federal ozone standard was violated 176 days,
and on the worst day peak ozone was three times the allowable
level. Every other major urban area in California also experiences
exceedances [sic] of federal and state ozone standards.0
4
The California Legislature noted specifically that people "have a pri-
mary interest in the quality of the physical environment in which they
live."105 Thus, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting clean
air.
The proposed regulations do not trigger the more stringent sub-
stantive due process requirements of a narrowly drawn regulation fur-
thering a substantial government interest, which results from the
infringement of a personal liberty or fundamental right.106 Because
the proposed ARB regulations affect only economic interests, the
courts will apply a much less stringent rational relation standard
when considering their validity. As in Griffin Development Co. v. City
of Oxnard,10 7 where the city imposed stringent standards on conver-
vider, did not violate the victim's due process rights by reducing the value of malpractice
actions, since the provision was rationally related to the legitimate state interest in reducing
insurance costs in the medical malpractice area. Id. at 676.
103. See Schad v. Mount Ephrian, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In Schad, the appellants operated a
bookstore where a coin-operated mechanism allowed the customers to view a live nude dancer.
The United States Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect
such expressions. Id. at 68.
104. Hearing on Alternative Motor Fuels Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research and
Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-
15 (1989) (statement on alternative fuels by Charles R. Imbrecht, Chairman, California En-
ergy Commission).
105. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 39000; see also supra text accompanying note 33.
106. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
107. 703 P.2d 339, 342-43 (Cal. 1985).
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sions of apartment buildings to condominiums, a court in evaluating
the proposed clean fuel regulations will require only a rational rela-
tion between the means chosen and the ends pursued. The "means"
the ARB chose to improve air quality mandate the distribution and
sale of clean fuels for vehicles needed to meet continuously decreasing
emission requirements. 108 Improved air quality constitutes the
"ends" pursued. A rational relation exists, since automakers must
certify that their vehicles meet the lower emission standards and vehi-
cle emissions affect air quality. 1°9 The ARB estimates that the pro-
posed regulations would reduce NMOG by 185 tons per day and
nitrogen oxides by 248 tons per day by the year 2010.110 These reduc-
tions represent twenty-eight percent of all on-road vehicular NMOG
emissions and eighteen percent of all on-road vehicular nitrogen oxide
emissions.I1 I Moreover, the percentages will continue to climb as mo-
torists scrap their older vehicles in favor of lower-emission vehicles.
2. Regulatory Construction of a Federal Statute
The United States Supreme Court, in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.," 2 established a two-step analysis to
guide judicial review of a regulatory agency's statutory construction:
First... is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that
is the end of the matter .... [Second, i]f ... the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the stat-
ute .... [Rather, it determines] whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute."l 3
To make the initial determination whether the statute expresses con-
gressional intent unambiguously, and to ascertain its plain meaning,
"the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as
well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."'"14
In Chevron U.S.A., the Supreme Court accepted the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's ("EPA") reasons for reversing its policy
of requiring a permit when a polluter attempted to offset emissions
108. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
109. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1193.
110. ARB INITIAL STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 60.
111. Id.
112. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
113. Id. at 842-43.
114. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
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reductions from one piece of process equipment in a plant against in-
creased emissions from a new or modified part of the plant."15 The
EPA reasoned that if it continued to require permits, the polluter
might not replace existing pollution control equipment with new,
more efficient, and less polluting equipment." 16 To the contrary, the
EPA found that requiring permits would result in the undesirable
phenomenon of higher emissions. Thus, the Court determined that
the agency's change was reasonable." 7
3. Statutory Construction of the ARB Proposal
In considering the proposed California regulations on clean fuels,
the overall statute mandating emission controls does not specifically
mention clean fuels as a control device, but allows alternatives to be
added to the fixed statutory list.118 The proposed clean fuels regula-
tions represent a "permissible construction of the statute" 1 9 because
of the extent of the required emissions reductions and the probability
that such reductions will not be met with conventional gasolines.
The United States Supreme Court, in Motor Vehicle Manufactur-
ers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 120 stated
that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if the agency relied
upon factors that Congress believed were irrelevant, ignored impor-
tant arguments or evidence, failed to articulate a reasoned basis for
the rule, or produced an explanation that was "so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise."' 2 1 One commentator noted that according to Chevron,
whenever legislative statutory directives are not "directly on
point . . . , the court must step aside to free the agency (within the
modest constraints of making a rational choice) to resolve what its
statute shall mean."'
122
If Congress has not spoken to the "precise question at issue," and
Congress' intent is unclear, the court must sustain the agency's inter-
pretation if it is reasonable in light of the language, legislative history,
115. Chevron USA., 467 U.S. at 857-58.
116. Id. at 858.
117. Id. at 862-63.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
119. Chevron US.A., 467 U.S. at 843.
120. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
121. Id. at 43.
122. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Adminis-
trative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 462-63 (1989).
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and policies of the statute. 123 The judiciary may not "substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpreta-
tion made by the administrator of an agency."' 24 Given the above
factors, a court should find the ARB clean fuels proposal
constitutional.
D. Due Process Analysis-Mandated Clean Fuel Sales Volumes
The ARB's proposed regulations mandate the distribution of cer-
tain volumes of clean fuels.125 One cannot sell a product, however, if
no demand exists. The ARB plans to mandate sales volumes for al-
ternative fuels based on the number of alternative-fueled vehicles
sold. 126 The ARB recognizes, however, that some of these vehicles
will be flexible-fueled vehicles ("FFVs"). In an FFV, the consumer
can choose between conventional gasoline and the alternative fuel.
Owners of these FFVs could choose to use conventional gasoline at
higher levels than the ARB projects 127 because of convenience, price,
or performance. This would lower actual demand for alternative fuels
below the ARB's mandated sales volumes. Thus, this portion of the
regulation as presently written appears arbitrary, capricious, and vio-
lative of due process.
1. Governmental Price Incentives-Brazilian Experience
A famous tenet of economics is that "the lower the price, the
greater the quantity demanded."' 128 Thus, the level of sales is contin-
gent on price. 129 Setting too low a price will result in a very low re-
turn on investment, thereby aggravating the "takings" problem
previously discussed. 130
Brazil's method of introducing ethanol into its fuel economy of-
fers a solution to the potential alternative fuel demand pricing prob-
123. Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-45.
124. Id. at 844.
125. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1194.
126. ARB INITIAL STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 48-49.
127. Id. The Staff Report contains proposed adjustment factors that range from 25% to
90% for calculating the total mandated volume of alternative fuel sales. These adjustment
factors represent the ARB's estimates of the percentage of alternative versus total fuel
purchased by FFV owners. Id.
128. JAMES M. HENDERSON & RICHARD E. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A
MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 26 (2d ed. 1971).
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 53-93.
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lem. 13 In Brazil, the government did not mandate the sale of specific
volumes of neat ethanol, its alternative fuel. Instead, it taxed conven-
tional gasoline at a higher rate and used those funds to subsidize etha-
nol.' 32 Currently in the United States, the federal government and
some states provide tax incentives for the use of alternative fuels. 133
The California Legislature could also provide tax incentives for using
alternative fuels to spur demand for them.
2. Fuel Marketer Lacks Direct Control of Consumer Demand
In National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. United States EPA,34
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals struck down regulations
requiring a gasoline carrier to produce "exculpatory" documentation
on the gasoline volatility of the load carried. 35 The court found the
regulations arbitrary and capricious because they did not require the
shipper to provide gasoline volatility documentation to the carrier. 36
The carrier could not directly control the availability of "exculpa-
tory" documentation, just as the gasoline marketers covered by the
proposed ARB regulations 137 cannot directly control the sales
volumes of alternative fuels purchased by the consumers.
The ARB did not state specific findings in either the proposed
regulations 138 or the accompanying Staff Report 39 to support the rea-
sonableness of the mandated sales volume calculation method. It pro-
vided no explanation for the reasonableness of its estimates that FFV
alternative fuel use, as opposed to conventional gasoline use, will rise
steadily from twenty-five percent to ninety percent of the total fuel
consumed by FFVs.' 4° As stated in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States,I41 the regulatory agency did not "articulate any ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choice made."' 42
131. For a full discussion of the Brazilian Alternative Fuel Plan, see infra part III.
132. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 99.
133. The federal government gives a 5.4 cent per gallon exemption for mixtures of gasoline
and at least 10% alcohol. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4081(c)(1) (West. Supp. 1991). Several states, such
as Oregon and Illinois, have tax incentives for the use of alternative fuels. Oregon Governor to
Sign EJO Incentive Bill into Law, OxY-FUEL NEWS, Aug. 5, 1991, at 4.
134. 907 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
135. Id. at 185.
136. Id. at 184.
137. Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 90, No. 32-Z, at 1189-97.
138. See id. at 1194.
139. See ARB INITIAL STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 48-49.
140. See id.
141. 371 U.S. 156 (1962).
142. Id. at 168.
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In Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion ("ICC") improvidently exercised its discretion by granting certi-
fication to an additional carrier. 43 The ICC chose this option rather
than issuing a cease and desist order to presently existing carriers who
refused to accept and deliver traffic because of the union's secondary
boycott.'" The United States Supreme Court determined that there
were no findings and no analysis by the ICC to justify its decision. 45
The ICC's omissions are similar to the ARB's lack of findings on the
reasonableness of their mandated alternative fuels sales volumes.'4
Apparently, the ARB assumes that fuel marketers can somehow
force consumers to purchase fuel. The ARB did not discuss the rea-
sonableness of its alternative fuel demand assumptions. Thus, it
either did not consider the problem or had no basis for its assump-
tions. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,' 47 the United States Supreme Court, find-
ing that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration acted
arbitrarily in revoking mandates for passenger restraints, stated that
"an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency...
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem."' 48 To comply
with the ARB's proposed regulations, gasoline marketers must de-
pend upon consumer purchases of alternative fuels. It appears that
the ARB did not consider factors affecting consumer demand when
setting the alternative fuel mandated sales volumes. This is a very
"important aspect of the problem," and the ARB failed to explain
how the percentage of alternative fuels, versus conventional gasoline,
used in FFVs will rise steadily from twenty-five to ninety percent of
the total fuel purchased.
3. Reliance on Market Forces
In Farmers Union Central Exchange, Inc. v. Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission, 49 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission' 50
("FERC") set rate ceilings at levels that, in practice, would admit-
143. Id. at 165.
144. Id. at 158, 163-65.
145. Id. at 167.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 143-45.
147. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
148. Id. at 43.
149. 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Farmer's
Union Cent. Exch., 469 U.S. 1034 (1984).
150. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is charged by Congress to set oil pipe-
line rates at "just and reasonable" levels. Id. at 1493.
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tedly be considered "egregiously extortionate." 15 1 The FERC argued
that they could rely on market forces to keep prices at reasonable
levels. The court, however, found "undocumented reliance on market
forces... misplaced,"'1 52 and remanded the case to the FERC for rate
ceiling modifications. 153 Similarly, the mandated clean fuel sales
volumes in the proposed ARB regulations rely on consumer market
demand that may or may not develop.1 54 Thus, the ARB relies on an
unsupported factual assumption about future market demand. This
portion of the proposed ARB regulations is arbitrary and capricious.
4. Mandated Alternative Fuel Availability
Instead of requiring gasoline marketers to sell specific volumes of
alternative fuels, the ARB could mandate the availability of such
fuels. In a similar situation, when it became clear that cars using cat-
alytic converters required unleaded fuel, the EPA did not mandate
the sale of specific volumes of unleaded fuel.1 55 Rather, it required
the availability of unleaded fuel at service stations. 5 6 Thus, mandat-
ing the availability of alternative fuels would be a feasible option for
the ARB.
5. Unconstitutionality of Mandating Clean Fuel Sales Volumes
Requiring the distribution of certain volumes of clean fuel ap-
pears unconstitutional for a number of reasons. First, the gasoline
marketer lacks direct control over volumes purchased from him by
the consumer. 157 In addition, the ARB lacks a factual basis to sup-
port its mandated alternative fuel sales volumes,158 and relies on mar-
ket forces to carry forward its specific volume mandate. 5 9
However, reasonable alternatives exist. These include tax incen-
tives for alternative fuels to make them more price competitive,
151. Id. at 1510.
152. Id. at 1508.
153. Id. at 1530.
154. See supra text accompanying note 140.
155. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.22.
156. Id. These regulations required that at least one grade of unleaded gasoline be offered
for sale at any retail outlet where 150,000 or more gallons were sold during any calendar
quarter after 1971. Id. This regulation was withdrawn effective June 3, 1991, because of the
widespread use of unleaded gasoline, which now comprises over 90% of the total gasoline sales
in the United States. 56 Fed. Reg. 13,767-68.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 137-48.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 125-27, 137-48.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
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thereby increasing demand. Tax incentives, in combination with
mandated availability of alternative fuels at service stations, would
prompt public use of these alternative fuels, as in Brazil, where con-
sumers were influenced to use neat ethanol as an alternative fuel.' 60
E. Summary of the Proposed ARB Plan
The magnitude of California's air quality problems addressed by
the proposed regulations justify state government intervention.
Although the proposed regulations require service stations to install
new equipment, a "taking" will not occur, given the ability of major
gasoline marketers to finance such investments. In light of the critical
need for improved air quality, a court would also probably not find a
due process violation, even though these regulations restrict service
station owners' freedom of action. A constitutional problem exists,
however, in the area of mandated sales volumes for alternative fuels.
Marketers cannot directly control and satisfy consumer demand for
the alternative fuels, given the whims of the marketplace and the un-
predictable nature of consumer demand.
Mandated availability of alternative fuels at a specified number of
service stations could serve as a reasonable alternative to mandated
sales. The ARB could require the availability of alternative fuels at a
specific number of locations. As a result, sales of these fuels would
occur naturally as cars equipped to use these fuels come onto the
streets and consumer demand rises. Following in Brazil's footsteps,
the ARB could also help spur the demand for alternative fuels by
enticing the California Legislature to provide tax incentives making
the price of alternative fuels relatively lower than conventional
gasoline.
III. BRAZILIAN NATIONAL ALCOHOL PLAN-"PROALCOOL"
During the last fifteen years, the Brazilian government intro-
duced ethanoll6l into its fuel economy, first as a conventional gasoline
blending component and later as an alternative fuel.162 California can
use this experience as guidance as it contemplates the possible use of
alternative fuels. Phase I of Brazil's ethanol program called for etha-
160. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 99. For a discussion of the Brazilian program, see infra
notes 161-209 and accompanying text.
161. Ethanol is the alcohol commonly consumed by people. It is generally produced by
fermenting plant products, such as corn or sugar cane. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INST. PUBLI-
CATION 4261, at 18-21 (2d ed. 1988).
162. See generally DEMETRIUS, supra note 5; BARZELAY, supra note 15.
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nol use as a conventional gasoline blending component 63 that did not
require consumers to modify their vehicles. In Phase II, the Brazilian
government, wishing to expand the use of ethanol, developed an am-
bitious program to use ethanol as a neat fuel in cars designed for its
use. 164 Thus, ethanol became an alternative fuel in this second
phase. 1
65
A. Phase I-Ethanol as a Gasoline Blending Component
On November 14, 1975, Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel es-
tablished the Brazilian National Alcohol Plan, Proalcool, by de-
cree. 16 6 Proalcool specifically focused on protecting the Brazilian
sugar sector from collapse following a violent downturn in sugar
prices. 167 Originally, the Brazilian government sought to stabilize
sugar prices by transforming excess sugar into anhydrous ethanol 6
for blending with gasoline, thereby creating gasohol for use in un-
modified automobile engines. 169 In Phase 1 (1975-78), the sugar cane-
to-ethanol program provided financial stability for Brazil's sugar
industry. '7 0
B. Phase 11-Neat Ethanol as an Alternative Fuel
In 1979, when international sugar prices failed to rebound, and
following the second Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
crude oil price shock,' 7 ' Proalcool entered its second phase. In Phase
II, pure alcohol, alcohol not mixed with gasoline, was used to power
the nation's auto fleet. 172 As such, ethanol served as an alternative
fuel. Accordingly, automakers in Brazil had to design, produce, and
sell cars specifically adapted for its use. The primary justifications for
the plan were foreign exchange savings resulting from lower crude oil
imports and foreign exchange credits resulting from the export of su-
163. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 10-11.
164. Id. at 11.
165. Neat ethanol cannot be used in a conventional vehicle without major modifications.
Thus, neat ethanol fits the definition of alternative fuel presented in the Introduction of this
Comment.
166. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 10.
167. Id. at 10-11.
168. Anhydrous ethanol contains no water.
169. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 11. One can use this gasoline/alcohol mixture, com-
monly known as gasohol, in conventional, unmodified gasoline powered automobiles. Thus,







In 1985, Brazil used alcohol to replace between 125,000 to
140,000 barrels per day of liquid fuels, mostly gasoline. 174 This re-
sulted in an annual foreign exchange savings of approximately one
billion dollars, about four percent of all foreign exchange earnings in
1985.175 However impressive, assuming an export market existed,
these figures did not reflect the opportunity costs associated with ex-
porting alcohol directly, and producing and exporting sugar. These
figures also ignored the massive application of capital resources to al-
cohol's production and marketing, and the incremental effort of auto-
mobile manufacturers needed to produce alternative fuel vehicles.
76
1. Ethanol Production
Since privately-owned firms produced all of Brazil's alcohol,
market forces determined Proalcool's technology and impacts. 177
However, the market in this military-ruled economy was not com-
pletely free.
Private industry produced ethanol in Brazil, but production re-
quired substantial and ongoing subsidies to both producers and con-
sumers to remain competitive. 178 Estimates place expenditures on the
program at between eight and ten billion dollars in private and public
resources during the 1975 to 1985 period. 179 In Phase II of the pro-
gram, Proalcool obtained open account status. 80 Banks gave credit
to ethanol producers and exempted programs related to ethanol from
the tighter fiscal policies imposed in Brazil during 1980.181 In com-
parison, the proposed ARB regulations provide no subsidies for the
production of alternative fuels.182
2. Vehicle Production
The subsidies to ethanol producers in Brazil would have been




177. Id. at 75.
178. Id. at 95.
179. Id.
180. BARZELAY, supra note 15, at 203.
181. Id. Targets for annual increases in credit allocation were no longer binding on the
financial agents. Banks were advised that the Central Bank would finance, at subsidized rates,
all ethanol projects meeting stated technical and financial specifications. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
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useless without the active technical and financial participation of au-
tomobile manufacturers. It is impossible to use neat ethanol in a con-
ventional gasoline-powered vehicle. 183 Brazil needed vehicle motors
and fuel systems to be specifically adapted for pure ethanol use.
184
The decision by automobile manufacturers to join the pro-Proalcool
coalition by producing vehicles that would burn neat ethanol, which
was an important factor out of the direct control of the Brazilian gov-
ernment, allowed the sugar-sector subsidy to become a full-fledged
energy program. 185
Furthermore, consumers would not buy vehicles designed to use
alternative fuels if the cost of the alternative fuels, such as neat etha-
nol, was much higher than gasoline. Thus, even though the Brazilian
government did not directly force the automobile manufacturers to
produce alternative fuel vehicles, automakers relied on the Brazilian
state to provide reasonably priced fuel. 186 Proalcool provided the
Brazilian fleet with a highly subsidized fuel. The major source of
funds for alcohol came from higher taxes on gasoline. 187 In this way,
the Brazilian government indirectly influenced the automobile manu-
facturers' decision to produce ethanol-fueled vehicles by controlling
relative ethanol and gasoline fuel pricing.
3. Other Market Forcing Techniques
Additional instruments employed by the Brazilian government to
encourage alcohol use in vehicles included subsidies and taxes on the
purchase of automobiles. 88 In 1981, for example, the government
permitted consumers to borrow money for three years if they
purchased an alcohol-fueled car. By contrast, consumers of gasoline-
powered cars were only given one year to pay back loans. 8 9 Consum-
ers valued these additional years to pay back the debt because of the
lower monthly payments. 90
In addition, performance increases when vehicles use ethanol as
a fuel. Ethanol has a higher octane rating than gasoline, and its use in
properly modified engines results in more power from equivalently
183. BARZELAY, supra note 15, at 73. "[T]he multinational automobile industry became
the key ... force behind this risky extension of Brazil's commitment to alcohol fuel." Id.
184. Id. at 203.
185. Id. at 256-57.
186. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 99.
187. Id.






The alcohol program's initial opponents became avid proponents
in the early 1980s when the availability of credit for alcohol distiller-
ies aided the ethanol program. 192 In 1981, the Central Bank and the
Banco do Brasil, after spending years denying credit to ethanol distil-
leries, began lending nearly all of the funds requested by distillery
investors. 193 In addition, Petrobras, the Brazilian government-owned
oil company, which had an obvious self-interest in maintaining a legal
monopoly over liquid fuel production, restrained its previously in-
tense criticism of the program. 94 Furthermore, the National Petro-
leum Council stepped in to assure that the alcohol marketing chain
would link production to consumption. 95 One scholar on the subject
concluded, "Since the substantive missions of these agencies did not
change.. . , we may presume that central decision makers.., became
more effective in their attempts to control the policy actions of
Proalcool's opponents."' 96
4. Changing from Pro-Alcohol Policy to the Cruzado Plan
After the zenith of the Proalcool program, the Brazilian military
conducted a phased withdrawal from direct control of the political
system. 97 Fearing hyper-inflation, President Jose Sarney introduced
the Cruzado Plan in early 1986.198 By establishing the primacy of
markets and prices in allocating resources, the Cruzado Plan moved
the economy away from its steered path toward a market-oriented
one. 199 Under the prior military regime, Proalcool stood as a prime
example of governmental over-involvement. 200 Production rested on
continued subsidies and demand was based on unrealistic pump
191. KNOWLES, supra note 8, at 196.
192. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
193. BARZELAY, supra note 15, at 88. During Phase I of the program, the Brazilian Cen-
tral Bank and the state-owned Banco do Brasil both openly defied President Geisel's explicit
demands to speed up disbursements of subsidized credit for distilleries. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 88-89.
197. DEMETRIUS, supra note 5, at 123.
198. Id. at 125.
199. Id. The most outstanding feature of this plan was the overnight de-indexation of the
Brazilian economy. Indexation is a system in which prices, wages, and interest rates on most
private and public debt instruments are adjusted periodically to account for inflation. The
Cruzado Plan also established a new currency, the cruzado, reset the foreign exchange rate,
and imposed a wage and price freeze. Id. at 125, 139.
200. Id. at 126.
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prices, while a multiplicity of state institutions regulated virtually
every aspect of production. 20 1 A commentator estimated that the real
cost of Brazilian ethanol production was fifty-five dollars per bar-
rel.20 2 One may compare this figure to the unstable, but always lower,
wholesale price of unleaded regular gasoline: $25.13 per barrel on
July 13, 1990,203 $37.18 per barrel on October 26, 1990,2° and $26.90
per barrel on November 15, 1991.205 Thus, the economic viability of
ethanol use is questionable in a truly free market Brazilian economy,
since ethanol costs so much more than the conventional gasoline it
replaces.
Early in 1990, Brazilian President Fernando Callor de Mello, as
part of a larger economic reform strategy, moved to dismantle the
Proalcool program because of its enormous cost.20 6 Shortages in alco-
hol supply for neat vehicles occurred early in 1990 when the Brazilian
government abandoned its policy to encourage an alcohol fuel econ-
omy. 20 7 In July 1990, prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the sales
percentage of new alcohol-fueled vehicles fell to an eight year low of
four and one-half percent, compared to ninety to ninety-five percent
in 1987 to 1988, when Proalcool reached its height. 20 8 On August 29,
1990, however, with the Persian Gulf crisis and the resulting rise in
oil prices, President Callor de Mello announced measures to resurrect
the alcohol fuels program. 20 9
5. Future Uncertainty
The future of Proalcool in Brazil is uncertain. However, it is
201. Id.
202. Id. at 128.
203. Price Report, OCTANE WK., July 16, 1990, at 12 (reporting the wholesale price of
unleaded regular gasoline in Houston, Texas on July 13, 1990). This was prior to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Scott J. Paltrow, Markets React to Kuwait Crisis, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at D4.
204. Price Report, OCTANE WK., Oct. 29, 1990, at 14 (reporting the wholesale price of
unleaded regular gasoline in Houston, Texas on October 26, 1990).
205. Price Report, OCTANE WK., Nov. 18, 1991, at 14 (reporting the wholesale price of
unleaded regular gasoline in Houston, Texas on November 15, 1991).
206. Alkman Granitsas, Persian Gulf Crisis Spurs Brazil to Resurrect Its Enormous Alcohol
Program, NEW FUELS REP., Sept. 3, 1990, at 1.
207. Brazil Seen Hiking Use of Gasoline, Methanol in Fuel to Avert Ethanol Shortage, NEW
FUELS REP., Sept. 17, 1990, at 5.
208. Id.
209. Id. Brazil currently imports about 50% of its oil, approximately 500,000 barrels per
day. Id. It is interesting to note that the United States imports 8,000,000 barrels per day of
crude oil and petroleum products, approximately 50% of its needs. Robert J. Beck, Politics
Shaping U.S. Oil, Gas Outlook in 1991, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 28, 1991, at 49-50.
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certain that there are currently two types of Brazilian automobiles,
those fueled by gasoline and those by ethanol. A vehicle owner can-
not interchange the two fuels without making major fuel system mod-
ifications. Thus, Brazil's fuel industry currently suffers from the
inefficiencies of providing two fuels. One is the more costly ethanol,
made from domestic agricultural products.210 The other is gasoline,
produced from over fifty percent imported crude oil. Gasoline is




Brazil's recent seesaw experience illustrates the dangers inherent
in a move to non-cost-competitive alternative fuels. Changes in gov-
ernment policy can occur when an alternative fuel moves into an in-
ferior position to conventional gasoline. Yet, vehicles designed to use
alternative fuels will remain in operation after the change in govern-
ment policy.
The Staff Report on the ARB's proposed clean fuel regulations
estimates the added annual cost benefit to consumers who own and
operate a light-duty LEV relative to a conventional vehicle operating
on gasoline as follows: $95 per year benefit for an electric vehicle; $40
per year benefit for an LPG-powered vehicle; $15 per year for a CNG-
powered vehicle; $30 per year added cost for a vehicle using reformu-
lated gasoline; $90 per year added cost for a methanol-powered vehi-
cle; and $445 per year added cost for an ethanol-powered vehicle. 2' 2
Thus, depending on the accuracy of these estimates, there may be an
economic incentive to alternative fuels for new vehicles in some cases.
For existing vehicles, however, these incremental costs and benefits do
not appear substantial enough to entice a consumer to buy a new vehi-
cle if a gasoline-powered vehicle still operates satisfactorily.
In September 1990, the ARB adopted the majority of the Clean
Fuel/Low-Emission Vehicle regulations discussed in this Com-
ment.21 3 The ARB, however, deleted the section mandating the dis-
tribution of specific volumes of clean fuels, and directed the ARB staff
to develop regulations requiring many more clean fuel retail outlets to
210. See supra text accompanying notes 202-04.
211. See supra note 209.
212. ARB INITIAL STATEMENT, supra note 9, at 68. The cost comparison presented as-
sumes that gasoline will cost $1.35 per gallon. Id.
213. See CARB to Mull Proposed Clean Fuel Regulations, OxY-FUEL NEWS, Nov. 19,
1990, at 5, 6.
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ensure widespread availability of the clean fuels. 214 Mandated distri-
bution was the only area of the proposed regulations this Comment
found unconstitutional. 215  A modified text incorporating these
changes was adopted by the ARB and approved by the Office of Ad-
ministrative Law on August 30, 1991.216 The new regulations for-
mally became effective September 29, 1991.217
The California fuel economy, similar to that in Brazil, will proba-
bly be burdened by the production and supply of at least two fuel
types. In fact, the ARB regulations do not specify the alternative fuel.
Thus, automakers could design vehicles requiring several alternative
fuel types. 218
In addition, one cannot expect air quality benefits overnight.
They will occur slowly as conventional vehicles age and consumers
replace them with alternative fuel vehicles. Thus, the commitment to
a program of this magnitude must be complete and long-lasting,
whether it is motivated by a balance of payments, as in the Brazilian




215. See supra text accompanying notes 126-60.
216. CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD, MAIL-OUT No. 91-43, NOTICE OF PUBLIC
HEARING TO CONSIDER AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS REGARDING THE CALCULATIONS
AND USE OF REACTIVITY ADJUSTMENT FACTORS FOR LoW-EMISSION VEHICLES AND THE
ADOPTION OF INITIAL REACTIVITY ADJUSTMENT FACTORS FOR PASSENGER CARS AND
LIGHT-DUTY TRUCKS CERTIFYING TO TRANSITIONAL Low-EMISSION VEHICLE EXHAUST
EMISSION STANDARDS (1991).
217. Id.
218. The ARB will hold hearings in December 1991 to decide on fuel specifications for a
variety of alternate fuels that will probably be marketed as a result of the Clean Fuel/Low
Emission Vehicle regulations discussed in this Comment. See CARB Prepares to Decide on
Alternate Fuels Specifications, OxY-FUELS NEWS, Nov. 11, 1991, at 7.
* For John-thank you for your encouragement, tolerance, and humor during my law
school years.
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